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bstract: Which party characteristics contribute to the rep-
resentation of young legislators? We examine this question 
quantitatively, focusing on the European Parliament (EP), 
and gauge the influence of the age of the party leader, the age of the 
party, the size of its support, party ideology and party nomination 
procedures on the age of politicians, based on data of all members who 
have served in the EP. We find that none of these characteristics matter 
substantively in explaining young representatives’ presence and discuss 
ways to further the field of research on youth representation.
Keywords: Young people, Parliamentary representation, Parties
Introduction
Parties are central for candidate selection to political office: They 
nominate contenders on lists as well as for direct seats and deter-
mine the candidate pool that voters can choose from (Meserve 
et al. 2009; Scarrow 2015; Webb 2010). As such, parties should 
have a tremendous influence on the demographic composition 
not only of the candidate pool, but also on the politicians who 
gain election. For example, research shows that recruitment struc-
tures in parties have an influence on the gendered composition of 
legislatures (Caul 1999), on the regional representation of politi-
cians in their parliamentary caucus (Deschouwer/Depauw 2014), 
and on the proportion of politicians from the ethnic minority 
group within their party caucuses as well as the whole legislature 
(Schönwälder 2013). In this study, we broaden the scope of previ-
ous studies by focusing on a so far under-researched group, name-
ly young people. While young adults may have normative claims 
to be represented in parliaments, they are generally marginalised 
in terms of legislative presence across the globe (Stockemer/Sund-
ström 2018).
We pose the following question for research: Which party charac-
teristics contribute to the representation of young legislators? We 
examine this research question in a quantitative research design 
taking advantage of the institutional structure of the European 
Parliament (EP). We use data on the age of the over 6,000 Mem-
bers of the EP (MEPs) ever elected, matched with information on 
five party characteristics that may explain variation in the pres-
ence of young parliamentarians; the age of the party leader, the 
age of the party, the size of party support, the ideology of the 
party, and the party’s nomination procedures. We regress a parlia-
mentarian’s age on these party characteristics and find that none 
of these characteristics matters.
We adopt the following structure: First, we situate this study with 
the literature on political representation. Next, we explain the 
case, research design and methods. We then present our results. 
Finally, we summarise the main findings and discuss how these 
insights can inform future research on youth representation.
Young people, political engagement and political representation
A characteristic of young people today is their political disengage-
ment. This disengagement with formal politics manifests itself on 
two levels. First, the young generation today is the one that partic-
ipates the least of all generations in elections, is the least politically 
interested, and the least politically represented in political offices 
(O’Neill 2007; Bhatti et al. 2012). To highlight this point: research 
focusing on Western countries (Wattenberg 2015) has found that 
young people lack basic knowledge about their political system, 
show little interest in political matters and display turnout numbers 
that are sometimes 30 or 40% lower than those of older gener-
ations. As an example of this increased disengagement, Blais and 
Loewen (2011) find that from the 1960s to the 2000s, turnout 
rates of newly eligible voters in Canada dropped from 70 to 40%.
In tandem with the crisis of political interest and participation, we 
are also experiencing a crisis of political representation of young 
adults.1 In modern societies, young people – defined largely as 
individuals in between 18 and 35 years, or 18 and 40 – are gen-
erally underrepresented, making up less than 10% of the national 
legislators despite the fact that they constitute 20 to 30% (and 
sometimes even more) of the voting age population (Stockem-
er/Sundström 2018). For example, several countries – such as 
the United States and India – could possibly be characterised as 
gerontocracies, where rulers are significantly older than the popu-
lation. Other countries, such as Japan, has been labelled a “silver 
democracy”, because young people are literally absent in elected 
assemblies system and decisions tend to favour the opinions of 
 citizens above 65 years (Sota 2018). Existing comparative studies 
on young people’s representation concur that the legislative pres-
ence of young is low and that this underrepresentation negatively 
influences the democratic attitudes and the political engagement 
of young cohorts of the population (Joshi 2013; IPU 2014). 
Taken together, the crises of participation and representation con-
stitute a vicious cycle of political disengagement among young 
adults (Prainsack/Vodanovic 2013). On the one hand, young 
people, because they do not see themselves and their  concerns 
represented, become more and more politically disenfranchised. 
On the other, there is a risk that parties cater less and less to 
the demands of the young generation, both substantively and 
 representationally, because the group of young voters becomes 
increasingly small (Van Parijs 1998).
A
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Belonging to the group of young is different than belonging to 
other politically marginalised groups, such as women or ethnic 
minorities, because being young is only a temporary stage in 
life.2 Yet, this does not make the topic of youth representation 
less relevant. Rather contrary, the continuing representation of 
young people in legislatures is crucial both from a normative and 
a policy perspective (Henn/Foard 2012). Normatively, a democ-
racy should provide opportunities for political participation for 
all citizens regardless of one’s ethnicity, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, gender or age (Phillips 1998). From a policy perspective, 
young people may have interests and hold views that are likely 
to differ significantly from that of older individuals. To illustrate, 
some policy areas – e.g. rules of military conscription (such as 
the draft in the United States) and age limits on the rights of 
drinking, driving, voting as well as standing for elections – affect 
citizens differently based on their age. This may especially be true 
for spending priorities of public funds. Empirical findings suggest 
that young adults tend to favour free secondary and tertiary ed-
ucation, while the middle-aged may be more averse to increased 
taxation (Jennings/Niemi 2014). Another aspect is differences 
in values. Young individuals tend to have more pluralistic and 
egalitarian beliefs, whereas older individuals have a tendency to 
hold more traditional attitudes (Abramson/Inglehart 2009). For 
example, McEvoy (2016) notes that young Europeans are more 
supportive of same-sex marriage than older ones.
These differences in priorities might directly translate into policy. 
If nobody represents young adults, it is unlikely that their spe-
cific priorities will be taken into consideration. For instance, our 
own work suggests that, as in the population, young members in 
the US House of Representatives tend to vote for stricter envi-
ronmental legislation compared to older ones.3 In general terms, 
the literature supports the assumption that higher descriptive rep-
resentation of an outgroup leads to higher substantive representa-
tion. For example, in an experimental study, Mendelberg et al. 
(2014) find that a critical mass of women in decision-making 
bodies is needed so that women can voice and push through dis-
tinctive female concerns pertaining to the family, children, and re-
distributive politics. Focusing on another “outgroup” in politics – 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people – Hansen 
and colleagues (2015) show that LGBT legislators can positively 
influence symbolic (low-cost gestures and actions) and substan-
tive representation (laws regulating the rights of the LGBT com-
munity). We believe that the same will be true for young adults.4
Hence, encouraging young people to participate in politics, and 
to give them the chances to do so, might not only positively in-
fluence their democratic credentials by telling them that their 
views are taken seriously and respected in the political arena (Gi-
roux 2003), but may break the vicious cycle of disengagement 
as well. The academic literature could also do its part by raising 
more awareness of the underrepresentation of young adults in the 
political process and by elucidating the factors that contribute to 
young people’s underrepresentation.
In fact, the existing studies – fewer than a dozen in number – il-
lustrate that for various Western countries the age group between 
50 and 65 is the most overrepresented in parliaments (see Narud/
Valen 2000; Murray 2008; Kissau et al. 2012). When it comes to 
explanatory factors, the literature is even scarcer and mainly fo-
cuses on the role of electoral systems to explain variation in young 
people’s representation. For instance, Reynolds (2011) finds that 
plurality rule fosters the election of young adults. In contrast, 
Joshi’s (2013) study of a handful of Southeast Asian countries re-
ports the contrary; that is, proportional representation fosters the 
election of young legislators (see also Joshi 2015). Stockemer and 
Sundström’s (2018) comparative study confirms this latter finding 
using a global sample of more than 100 countries.
Yet, what is missing from existing studies is a comprehensive 
analysis of political parties. This is surprising given that parties 
are at the centre of the recruitment process; they fill the repre-
sentative space and aggregate interests (Gauja 2016). Even more 
importantly, it is mainly party elites who decide who gets nom-
inated, for what constituency or on which list position (Hassell 
2016). Given the empirical record of a stark underrepresentation 
of young politicians, it is safe to conclude that political parties are 
reluctant to nominate young members to their parliamentary del-
egations. Nevertheless, there is variation between parties. For ex-
ample, in the European Parliament – the empirical referent of our 
study – there are some party delegations, such as the one of the 
Spanish Podemos Party in the most recent parliament, in which 
the average age was less than 40 at the time of election. Other 
delegations, such as the ones from parties in Estonia or Poland, do 
not have a single parliamentarian aged 40 or below in the current 
2014–2019 Parliament.
Which party characteristics contribute to the representation of 
young legislators? We test this question based on a comprehensive 
analysis of five party features. While the empirical record indi-
cates that parties are reluctant (to say the least) to nominate young 
candidates, there should still be variation in the types of political 
parties in promoting or hindering young politicians to gain rep-
resentation. Therefore, party features should matter in influencing 
the representation of young adults in parliaments including the 
EP. In this article, we evaluate the extent to which the five party 
features – the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the 
size of party support, party ideology, and formal recruitment pro-
cedures – explain variation in parties’ propensity to have young 
politicians elected for a seat in Strasbourg and Brussels.
Party characteristics and youth representation: hypotheses
Age of the party leader
Party elites are important in the candidate nomination process 
and the most important elite person is the party leader. In par-
ticular, the leader can propel individuals upwards within the party 
hierarchy and on electoral lists. We see several reasons why young 
party leaders should promote other young candidates. First, the 
If nobody represents young adults, it is unlikely that 
their specific priorities are taken into consideration.
We evaluate the extent to which the five party features – 
the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size 
of party support, party ideology, and formal recruitment 
procedures – explain variation in parties’ propensity to 
have young politicians elected for a seat in Strasbourg 
and Brussels.
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psychological literature highlights that individuals tend to prefer 
other individuals that resemble themselves (Hamlin et al. 2013). 
According to Crowder-Meyer (2013), this should be especially 
true for outgroup leaders, who might be particularly willing to 
support members of their own group to control imbalances in 
representation. As such, young leaders representing one outgroup 
might be especially willing to nominate other young adults.5 
Second, the professional and private networks of young lead-
ers should naturally consist of other young individuals, which, 
in turn, should further foster their likelihood to nominate other 
young individuals. Third, young leaders might feel more of a nor-
mative need to balance the inequalities in age representation than 
older leaders.
Hypothesis 1: Parties with a younger party leader are likely to have 
younger MEPs.
The age of the party
The age of the party organisation is a second party-level factor that 
might influence the representation of young legislators. Most im-
portantly, we expect that old organisations have long-established 
networks of command consisting mainly of middle-aged and 
senior men, so-called “old boys networks” (Dahlerup/Leyenaar 
2013). Outgroups, including female and young party members, 
might have problems in penetrating these networks, which have 
formed over decades and which are crucial for the advancement 
of a political career (e.g. Bjarnegård/Kenny 2015). In contrast, 
younger parties do not usually have the same established and 
close-knit networks, which tend to benefit middle-aged and old 
men. In these parties, politicians of different ages, including the 
young, should find a more level playing field because closed-off 
networks are likely to be rarer.
Hypothesis 2: Parties that are younger are likely to have younger 
MEPs.
The size of party support
The third characteristic is the size of the party’s support base, 
which directly influences the party’s magnitude. Parties with 
a small legislative presence that can count on nominating only 
one or two members to the parliament are likely to nominate the 
type of individual which has the largest appeal to voters. In most 
cases, actors in gate-keeping positions of parties still think that 
this “winning candidate” is a middle-aged to senior man (Henig/
Henig 2001; Beauregard 2014). Young individuals might there-
fore not gain much traction if the party magnitude is small. In 
contrast, parties with larger support might have an incentive to 
diversify their slates to appeal to as many constituents as possible 
(in particular in the larger EU countries a large support base trig-
gers a high party magnitude in EP elections). This diversification 
might include the nomination of young individuals on eligible 
lists to portray the party as inclusive as possible.
Hypothesis 3: Parties with larger vote shares are likely to have 
younger MEPs.
Party ideology
We believe that the ideology of parties should not only matter 
in determining the voters they attract, the policy programmes 
they adopt and the legislation they pass if they are in power, but 
also the type of representatives they send to parliament (Paxton/
Kunovich 2003). Generally, left-leaning parties with a pluralistic 
and egalitarian culture should send more young individuals to 
parliament than traditional parties with a rather more regressive 
agenda. Nevertheless, a simple dichotomy between left and right 
might be too simplistic to capture the multidimensionality of the 
ideological space in Western societies in the 21st century (Caul 
1999). To highlight this point: a party such as the Front National 
can be economically left-leaning but highly conservative in social 
values. Other parties, such as some green or former communist 
parties, tend to be state-centred economically but very post-mod-
ern when it comes to their social values (Burchell 2014). With re-
gard to the ideological party space in Europe, there is also a third 
important value dimension, the pro-/anti-European integration 
dimension (see Bakker et al. 2012). Since the three dimensions do 
not necessarily overlap, we formulate hypotheses for each of them 
in the following sections.
With regard to the economic dimension, we expect state-centred 
(i.e. left-leaning) parties to nominate, on average, younger individ-
uals for electoral positions than centrist or right-wing parties. Two 
points could support this hypothesis. First, state-centred parties 
focus on equality in outcomes rather than opportunities (Bryson/
Heppel 2010): this focus on equality could benefit outgroups such 
as young people. Second, economically left-leaning parties tend to 
fight for outgroups such as ethnic minorities and women (Franc-
eschet/Thomas 2015). They might also do so for young individuals.
Hypothesis 4a: Parties with a left-leaning position on economic 
issues are more likely than economically right-leaning parties to 
have young MEPs.
Even more so than the economic dimension, we expect the lib-
ertarian/authoritarian cleavage to affect the representation of the 
young. Compared to their parents and grandparents, younger 
generations are more pluralistic and open to new ways of living 
and cultures. Parties with a post-materialist/libertarian position 
carry the values of the majority of young adults (see Sloam 2014). 
For example, some green parties such as the German Green Party 
promote very progressive values and are disproportionally popular 
among the young on Election Day (Dolezal 2010). It is thus likely 
that the parliamentary delegation of these parties is also compar-
atively young. In contrast, parties with an authoritarian platform 
tend to be traditional, protectionist and masculine, values that 
might not appeal to the majority of the young (Givens 2005). 
Having a rather old support base, these parties also tend to have 
an older parliamentary delegation.
Hypothesis 4b: Parties leaning towards a libertarian position are 
more likely to have young MEPs than those with an authoritarian 
position.
With regard to the economic dimension, we expect 
state centred (i.e. left-leaning) parties to nominate, on 
average, younger individuals for electoral positions than 
centre or right-wing parties.
We expect that old organisations have long-established 
networks of command consisting mainly of middle-aged 
and senior men, so-called “old boys networks”.
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In Europe, the pro-/anti-European cleavage is another important 
policy dimension, in particular for the young. Young individuals 
tend to support Europe and the European ideals; Europe provides 
them with opportunities to travel, study and work. Since young 
people tend to be strong advocates for European integration, and 
it is they who carry forward the European idea most convincing-
ly, it is likely that pro-European parties will also nominate more 
young politicians (Keating 2014). More indirectly, pro-European 
parties also frequently fare best in cosmopolitan cities, which also 
have a higher share of younger-generation inhabitants than ru-
ral areas. In contrast, older individuals tend to be more sceptical 
about the European idea (Gorodzeisky/Semyonov 2015). They 
might fear for their traditions, values and their nation state and 
might be drawn to more Eurosceptic parties, which, in turn, can 
be expected to nominate more of the elderly.
Hypothesis 4c: Pro-EU parties are more likely than anti-EU parties 
to have young MEPs.
Formal recruitment procedures
Finally – and using a subsample of our data, because information 
on this feature is only available for certain years – we look at the 
influence of formal recruitment procedures on youth representa-
tion. An article by Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) sug-
gests that different nomination procedures (i.e. self-nominations/
applications versus party-nominations) as well as the inclusiveness 
of the selectorate matters for the nomination and election of 
 female MEPs. We define the selectorate in legislative recruitment 
as “the group selecting the candidates” (2015: 770). They argue 
that self-nominations/applications could benefit the nomination/
representation of women; it allows those who have the ability and 
confidence to step forward. In contrast, party nominations are 
dependent on the decision by party-elites, which tend to consist 
of middle-aged men who often exclude outsiders such as women. 
Hence, they might be less likely to nominate women.
A similar argument could be made for young candidates. In the 
21st century, there should be numerous young candidates who 
have the ability, background and capability to put their name 
down for a nomination. As such, personal nominations or ap-
plications could benefit young individuals. In contrast, in par-
ty nominations young candidates might not even be part of the 
pool of candidates to be considered, because they do not have the 
network connection and experience, yet. A similar argument can 
be made about the selectorate: a very small selectorate of a small 
party elite mainly consisting of middle-aged to senior men may 
be less prone to present diverse lists that reflect the heterogeneity 
of the social groups in the party. In contrast, a large selectorate 
– consisting of a broader composition of actors – might benefit 
outgroups including women and the young.
Hypothesis 5a: Parties promoting self-nominations/applications 
rather than party nominations are likely to have younger MEPs.
Hypothesis 5b: Parties with an inclusive selectorate are likely have 
younger MEPs.
Data and methods
Our case to study the influence of party characteristics on youth 
representation is the European Parliament (EP). The EP gathers 
together parties from all member states of the European Union. 
While nationally all of these parties operate within a different in-
stitutional context, they all run in the EP election within the same 
three to four days’ election timeframe under a similar institutional 
context (i.e. after 1999 all parties get elected in multi-member 
districts) (Meserve et al. 2009). The fact that they are running 
for the same parliament, within the same time window and in a 
similar institutional context, increases the comparability of parties 
across countries (Raunio 2014).
In theory, the EP should be an institutional setting where young 
candidates could perform comparatively well. Generally labelled 
“second-order elections”, the EP elections are considered less im-
portant than the first-order national parliamentary or presidential 
elections in the eyes of the media, politicians and voters (Schmitt 
2005). As a result, a seat in Brussels and Strasbourg might not be 
as prestigious as a seat in the national legislature. This, in turn, 
could increase the chances of young individuals to gain a seat for 
two reasons. First, party elites might prefer a seat in the national 
legislature or executive. Second, a run for the EP might be a first 
stepping-stone for young individuals to gain their first parliamen-
tary experience.6
We test the influence of our different party characteristics on the 
age of MEPs based on the full population of legislators who have 
ever served in the eight European Parliaments that have existed 
so far (1979-1984 to 2014-2019). In the statistical analysis that 
follows, the bivariate graphs and the multivariate models meas-
ure the effect of the age of the party leader, the age of the party, 
the size of party support, and the ideology of the party on youth 
representation between 6069 and 5616 observations.7 Because of 
data unavailability for the other years, the models measuring the 
effect of territorial nominations and the selectorate on youth rep-
resentation use a subsample of approximately 700 MEPs for the 
session 2009-2014.
The dependent variable is the age of each parliamentarian at the 
time of election. We opt against an aggregation of the age of in-
dividual MEPs to the party level for several reasons: first, such a 
structure would treat small parties with one or two MEPs simi-
larly to large parties with 20 or 30 seats, despite the fact that the 
former only add a much smaller number of MEPs than the latter. 
Second, aggregating the data would also lead to more variation 
in the average or median age among smaller parties as compared 
to larger parties. To highlight this point: a party might send one 
member to Brussels and Strasbourg aged 70 years at time t. At the 
next election (t +1) the MEP might retire and be “replaced” by 
a young candidate aged 35. Hence, the aggregate age difference 
between the two elections would be 35 years. For larger parties, 
these considerable differences in the average or median age will 
Since young people tend to be strong advocates for 
European integration, and it is they who carry forward 
the European idea most convincingly, it is likely that 
pro-European parties will also nominate more young 
politicians.
There should be numerous young candidates who have 
the ability, background and capability to put their name 
down for a nomination. As such, personal nominations 
or applications could benefit young individuals.
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not happen. For these reasons, having individual MEPs as unit of 
analysis seems to be the most clear-cut analytical choice.
Our party variables are operationalised as follows. The first vari-
able, the age of the party leader, is the age (in years) of the party 
leader at the time of the election. Information on party leadership 
is primarily built from Zárate’s Political Collections (2016). We 
complemented this information by various sources on leaders’ 
date of birth, such as their personal webpages and publications 
such as the Political Handbook of the World (Lansford 2015). In 
the few cases where a party had several leaders or spokespersons 
(i.e. some green parties), we computed an average figure of their 
age. When a leadership change took place in the same year as an 
EP election, we chose the leader prior to the election. The second 
variable, party age, gauges the age (in years) of the respective party 
at the time of election. We mainly collected this information from 
the respective parties’ websites as well as from Zárate’s Political 
Collections (2016). The third variable, size of the party support, 
is the vote share that the respective party gained in the preceding 
national election. While we acknowledge that there are some fluc-
tuations in parties’ vote share between the national and the Euro-
pean Elections (e.g. non-government parties tend to gain support 
in the second-order context), we nevertheless believe that the na-
tional vote share provides a good estimate for parties to calculate 
their expected vote share in the EP elections. The data on a party’s 
national level vote share for the election preceding the European 
context come from the European Election Database (2016).
We used data from the ParlGov project to code the three dimen-
sions of parties’ ideology (Döring/Manow 2016). The ParlGov 
data has information on party positions that are time-invariant 
unweighted mean values of established party expert surveys on a 0 
to 10 scale. The economic scale aggregates the taxes versus spend-
ing dimension by Benoit and Laver (2006) with the dimension 
on state intervention in the economy by the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (Bakker et al. 2015). The libertarian versus authoritarian 
dimension uses the same sources and aggregates positions related 
to personal freedoms as well as the environment and lifestyles. 
The EU dimension gauges established measures (Ray 1999; Be-
noit/Laver 2006) on parties’ stance toward the EU based on their 
general orientations toward the EU, as well as their views on EU 
expansion.8
For the dimensions of formal recruitment procedures, we used 
two variables compiled by Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 
(2015). Nominations is a variable with four categories, gauging 
whether (a) candidates can formally nominate themselves, (b) if 
they have to be nominated, (c) whether parties allow for both 
types, or (d) if this information is unknown. To capture these four 
categories, we created three dummy variables, with the catego-
ry “candidates can formally nominate themselves” serving as the 
reference category. The second dimension, the inclusiveness of the 
selectorate measures the size of the selectorate. It has six catego-
ries: (1) all party members, (2) a subset of all party members, (3) 
committees, (4) party executives, (5) not specified and (6) mixed 
actors.9 The first category again serves as the reference category, 
the other five categories are captured by dummy variables.
To analyse the influence of party characteristics on the age of 
elected officials, we engage in six types of analyses. First, we dis-
play some univariate tables confirming the notion that the rep-
resentation of young individuals at the European Parliament is 
low. Second, we present a number of scatterplots displaying the 
bivariate relationship between each of the four independent var-
iables – the age of the party leader, the age of the party, the size 
of the party support, and the party ideology – and the dependent 
variable, the age of MEPs. To measure the influence of the nomi-
nation and selectorate dummy variables, we also display some de-
scriptive statistics. Third, we present a multiple regression model 
(i.e. OLS regression), where we regress the age of the politician 
at the time of election on the four party level characteristics for 
which we have complete data.10 There is also a very high turnover 
rate. In fact, we find that of the total of 6069 observations, only 
2423 were filled by incumbents. Substantively, this high turnover 
rate should give young candidates ample chances to get elected. 
More methodologically, this significant turnover rate makes a 
clustered approach or a pooled time series framework less suitable 
for the study at hand.
Fourth, we run separate OLS models for each of the eight par-
liamentary sessions (1979-1984 to 2014-2019), to disentangle 
possible trends over time. We deem OLS regressions an adequate 
modelling strategy. First, the dependent variable, the age of each 
parliamentarian at the time of the election, is normally distrib-
uted. Second, the high turnover rate renders a pooled approach 
impossible to perform. In the fifth step of the analysis, we per-
form two additional analyses as robustness checks. We create a 
dummy variable for young MEPs aged 40 and under at the time 
of election and run a binary logistic regression with this addi-
tional dependent variable. Moreover, we create an ordinal varia-
ble distinguishing young parliamentarians (aged 40 and under), 
middle-aged parliamentarians (aged 41 to 60) and elderly parlia-
mentarians (aged 61 and above) and measure the influence of our 
party-level characteristics on this categorical variable in an ordi-
nal regression framework. Finally, as a sixth step, we run an OLS 
model with our 2009-2014 data featuring nomination procedures 
and different types of selectorates on the right-hand side and the 
age of the MEP on the left hand side of the equation.
Results from the quantitative investigation
First, the univariate statistics confirm that there is indeed an 
underrepresentation of young legislators over time. Throughout 
the history of the EP, the presence of young MEPs of 40 years 
and below at the time of election has constantly loitered between 
16 and 20%. This figure has remained constant throughout the 
EP’s history (see Tables 1 and 2). If we look at the percentages 
of individuals of 35 years and below at the time of election they 
In theory, the EP should be an institutional setting where 
young candidates could perform comparatively well.
The third variable, size of the party support, is the vote 
share that the respective party gained in the preceding 
national election.
To analyse the influence of party characteristics on  
the age of elected officials, we engage in six types of 
analyses.
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are generally under 10% in the nearly four-decade history of the 
EP. Even more telling, the mean and median age of incoming 
MEPs is approximately 50 years (see Table 3). In more detail, the 
average MEP is elected at the age of 50.2. There is some slight 
variation between Western and Eastern Europe. Throughout the 
parliament’s history, MEPs from the West are 50.6 years old at 
the time of elections and MEPs from the East “only” 48.2 years 
old. This implies that at the end of each parliamentary term, the 
outgoing parliament has a median age of about 55 years, which is 
substantially older than the constituents in the EU, with a median 
age of 42.6 years in 2016 (Eurostat 2017).
If we look at individual parties, we find that the youngest party 
delegation was, on average, 21 years old and the oldest 78 years. 
However, parties with a median and average age below 30 or above 
70 are generally single-person delegations. In the category of very 
young delegations (i.e. those aged under 30, on average), we find, 
for example, the German Pirate Party in 2014, the Portuguese 
Communist Party in 2009, or the Danish Peoples’ Movement 
Against the EU in 2014. In the category very old (i.e. delegations 
with an average age over 70 years), we find the Polish Labour 
Union (2014), the Communist Party of Greece (1989), and the 
Christian Social Peoples’ Party of Luxembourg in 2004. In gener-
al, another trend we note is that the larger party delegations tend 
to be aged 50 to 60 years, on average, over the span of our study. 
This includes the Christian Democratic Party of Germany, the 
Socialist Party in France or Labour in Great Britain.
How much influence do party characteristics have on the age of 
incoming parliamentarians? Figures 1 to 6 disconfirm all of our 
initial hypotheses. Even in the bivariate realm the predicted line 
between any of the measures of party characteristics and the age 
of parliamentarians is rather flat in all graphs, indicating little to 
no impact. Neither the age of the party leader, the age of the 
party, the size of the party support, nor the ideology of the party 
influence whether parties send older or younger MEPs to Brussels 
and Strasbourg. Even more disappointing, the multivariate regres-
sion model indicates that all of the party characteristics together 
explain only about 1% in the variance in the age variation in the 
European parliament (see Table 5). The libertarian/authoritari-
an ideology dimension is the only variable where we find some 
very small substantive influence. As such, the regression model 
predicts that a rather libertarian party with a ranking of two is 
expected to have MEPs two years younger, on average, than a 
rather authoritarian party with a ranking of seven. For the other 
variables the influence is non-perceptible.
If we look at the eight regression analyses for the parliamentary 
sessions 1979-1984 to 2014-2019, there are also no consistent 
findings and the models have little to no explanatory power, ex-
plaining between 1 and 8% of the variance in a parliamentarian’s 
age (see Table 6). If we look at individual predictors, we see no 
consistent results. The only variable that has a significant influence 
in most models is the age of the party leader; yet substantively this 
influence is, again, tiny. The lack of influence of the party charac-
teristics is further confirmed in the binary and ordinary logistic re-
gressions (Table 7). Not only have both models a miniscule pseudo 
R squared, even more importantly, the proportional reduction in 
error is 0% for both models, further illustrating that the models do 
not add anything in comparison to random selection.
When we look at nomination procedures, the picture is simi-
lar (Table 8). With the exception that local nominations seem 
to slightly benefit the presence of young MEPs (i.e. local nom-
inations trigger parliamentary party delegations that are two to 
three years younger than nominations at another territorial level), 
neither the other levels of nomination nor the type of selectorate 
matters. This applies even more so considering that in our regres-
sion framework, the three dummy variables for levels of nomina-
tions and the five dummies for type of selectorate explain about 
1% of the variance in parliamentarians’ age variation.
Conclusion
This study allows for rather sober conclusions. Even in a sec-
ond-order setting, like the European Parliament, young people’s 
representation has been consistently low. Throughout the par-
liament’s history about 10% of the members have been aged 35 
years and below and the median parliamentarian at the time of 
her election has been aged over 50 years. We also find that parties 
of all types seem to do little to actively promote the presence of 
young adults and break the vicious cycle of young people’s po-
litical disengagement. Whether these political parties are old or 
young, have a larger or smaller support base, are right or left-lean-
ing, or whether they have a younger or older leader, they all ap-
pear reluctant to see young MEPs elected.
At the end of each parliamentary term, the outgoing 
parliament has a median age of about 55 years, which is 
substantially older than the constituents in the EU, with 
a median age of 42.6 years.
Neither the age of the party leader, the age of the party, 
the size of the party support, nor the ideology of the 
party influence whether parties send older or younger 
MEPs to Brussels and Strasbourg.
Table 1: Age distribution of MEPs since 1979, at the start of a term
Table 2: Age distribution through the eight parliamentary terms, at 
the start of a term (percentage)
Table 3: Median age throughout the eight parliaments, at the start 
of a term (years)
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What might increase young people’s representation could be the 
adoption of quotas (see Tremmel et al. 2015). As the literature 
on women’s representation shows, quotas can provide a relative-
ly quick boost in the representation of a so-far underrepresented 
group (Paxton/Hughes 2016). With a quota of 10 or 20%, parties 
would actually be obliged to replace some of their available seats 
with young candidates. This would give a direct boost to youth 
representation. Quotas could also have an indirect and psycho-
logical effect; they would show to young individuals that politics 
is not only the domain of the old. Rather, to the contrary, quotas 
would signal to young adults that politics is an area where their 
participation is encouraged and supported. While we are doubtful 
that many parties will engage in this path, we deem it the only 
quick fix to rectify the underrepresentation of young people in the 
European Parliament, and possibly elsewhere as well.
Figure 1: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the age of the 
party leader and the age of MEPs from this party Figure 4: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the ideology of 
the party (state/market dimension) and the age of MEPs from this party
Figure 2: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the age of the 
party and the age of MEPs from this party
Figure 5: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the ideology of 
the party (authority/liberty dimension) and the age of parliamentarians
Figure 3: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the party 
support size and the age of MEPs from this party
Figure 6: Scatterplot displaying the relationship between the ideology 
of the party (pro-European/anti-European dimension) and the age of 
MEPs from this party
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On a more general note, we need more studies tackling (the lack 
of ) young people’s representation. Not only do we know relative-
ly little about the factors that could potentially increase youth 
representation, we know even less about the factors surrounding 
young people gaining candidacy status. Are some types of par-
ties more likely to nominate more candidates than others? Based 
on the results of the election of young deputies to the EP, we 
doubt that there is huge variation within parties. Nevertheless, 
to confirm this conjecture, future research should look at young 
politicians as candidates to elected office. Yet, and while there is 
still abundant research on young people in politics to do, we have 
shown that differences in types of parties and their nomination 
procedures do not explain any substantial variation in the age of 
parliamentarians in the EP.
Notes
1 Historically, there are numerous examples where the younger 
generations were described as unfit for holding office. For in-
stance, Plato believed that the philosophical maturity of individu-
als was reached after the age of fifty (McKee/Barber 2001).
2 To illustrate this point, being from an ethnic minority group is 
a feature that seldom changes for an individual. Gender identity 
is mutable for some individuals and, similarly, economic standing 
is a group characteristic from which some individuals shift during 
their lifespan. As a contrast, the shifting of age is inevitable; being 
young is a characteristic that is temporary from an individual’s 
perspective.
Table 4: The influence of nomination procedures and the size of the 
selectorate on the age of parliamentarians, at the start of a term (2009 
sub-sample)
Table 7: Binary logistic and ordinal logistic regression models meas-
uring the influence of party level characteristics on age categories of 
parliamentarians
Table 8: The multiple regression model measuring the influence 
of party level characteristics on the age of parliamentarians, 2009 
sub-sample12
Table 5: Multiple regression model measuring the influence of party 
level characteristics on the age of parliamentarians11
Table 6: Multiple regression model measuring the influence of party lev-
el characteristics on the age of young parliamentarians per election year
On a more general note, we need more studies tackling 
(the lack of) young people’s representation. Not only do 
we know relatively little about the factors that could 
potentially increase youth representation, we know even 
less about the factors surrounding young people gaining 
candidacy status.
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3 Forthcoming work by the authors, building on representatives’ 
roll-call votes since 2016 on issues relating to environmental leg-
islation.
4 For a theoretical discussion of the benefits of higher youth rep-
resentation, see Henn et al. 2002; Tremmel et al. 2015.
5 Paxton and Hughes (2016) make a similar argument when it 
comes to the representation of women.
6 A prerequisite of our large-n study is that we discuss processes of 
candidacy, yet we study observational data on the final outcomes 
of these processes: the MEPs that are successful in getting elected. 
We chose this scope since it is election that matters the most, 
across time and parties. For example, simple candidacy status will 
not empower young politicians to draft legislation, vote on bills 
and make sure that young people get what they want – but the 
election of these young candidates does. In addition, studies that 
use data on candidates to the EP (e.g. Meserve et al. 2009) can 
only study those lists and parties where electoral information is 
available, which tremendously limits the scope of these analyses.
7 We do not include independents in our data-sample. Our data 
mainly stems from national parties, but, of course, there are also 
some MEPs from regional parties, such as the German Christian 
Social Union. See the Online Appendix on www.igjr.org for a list 
of the parties, with their English names.
8 To further gauge that the three dimensions are distinct, we run 
a correlation analysis and find a medium-strong correlation be-
tween the economic and the value dimension (the Pearson Cor-
relation Coefficient is .59), a rather weak correlation between the 
pro-/anti-EU dimension and value dimension (the Pearson Cor-
relation Coefficients is .32) and no correlation between the pro-/
anti-EU dimension and the economic dimension (the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient is .02).
9 In their dataset, no information exists on parties in Croatia, 
which is therefore excluded in these models.
10 To test for the appropriateness of OLS, we first check for nor-
mality. Appendix 1 highlights that the age of EU parliamentarians 
is nearly perfectly normally distributed; there are also no outliers, 
which is a sign of homoscedasticity.
11 If we add country dummies or fixed effects, the effect of the 
independent variables becomes even smaller.
12 If we add country dummies or fixed effects, the effect of the 
independent variables becomes even smaller.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: The distribution of the dependent variable, the age of 
MEPs on the day of the election
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